Why Systems Fail, and How to Design Resilient Ones
Northvolt, pre-mortems, and the eight failure modes
Before we start
Europe's best-funded green industrial bet raised over thirteen billion dollars, was backed by Volkswagen and Goldman Sachs, was founded by former Tesla executives, and was called the "Swedish Tesla." Then it went bankrupt. Not because the science was wrong, but because it could not build batteries fast enough, lost a big customer, and ran out of road. Its name was Northvolt, and dissecting why it failed will teach you more than any success story.
This is the module most courses skip, and the one that will make you useful. Anyone can describe how recycling should work. The valuable skill is seeing how it actually fails, so you can design around the failure before it happens. We use real, recent European cases, because the lessons are sharper when the money was real.
By the end you should be able to: (1) name the common failure modes and recognise their early symptoms; (2) tell a technical failure from a commercial or operational one; (3) diagnose a described failing system and propose targeted fixes; (4) run a "pre-mortem" on a new project.
Part A — The eight recurring failure modes
Most recycling failures fall into a short list. Learn the symptoms, not just the names — this list doubles as a diagnostic checklist.
- No end market — bales nobody buys, or material quietly landfilled after collection. Never add a material to collection without a confirmed buyer.
- Over-contamination — high rejection rates, the processor raising fees or walking away (Modules 4 and 5).
- Public apathy or confusion — low participation, recyclables still in the trash.
- Underfunding — a programme launched then cut when budgets tighten or prices fall.
- Infrastructure mismatch — a plant built for yesterday's waste choking on today's.
- Ignoring waste reduction — recycling plateaus while consumption rises faster.
- External shocks — a single policy or market change breaks everything (China, 2018).
- Scaling failure — a technology that works in the lab or demo plant but cannot be built at industrial scale, on time, on budget.
The reality behind Europe's targets
Module 8 listed ambitious EU targets. Here is the honest gap: the EU-27 recycled about 48.6% of municipal waste in 2022 against a 55% target for 2025, and the European Environment Agency has flagged many member states as off-track. A target without the infrastructure, markets, and behaviour to support it is just a number. Your job as an engineer is to build the system that can actually hit it.
Technical failure versus commercial failure
This distinction, met with Carbios in Module 6, deserves its own place, because confusing the two is one of the most expensive mistakes in the field. A technology, or a company, can be scientifically sound and still fail on cost, financing, demand, or the sheer difficulty of scaling. The case below is the clearest recent example.
Part B — Case spotlight: the anatomy of Northvolt's collapse
Northvolt — when $13bn isn't enough
Northvolt was founded in Sweden in 2016 by two former Tesla executives, Peter Carlsson and Paolo Cerruti, to build "the world's greenest battery," powered by hydro electricity in northern Sweden, with battery recycling as a stated priority. It raised over $13 billion in about seven years, attracted Volkswagen and Goldman Sachs as backers, and at its peak was hiring around 150 people a week. It was, genuinely, Europe's best hope for a home-grown battery industry.
It still collapsed. Northvolt filed for Chapter 11 protection in the US in November 2024 and then for bankruptcy in Sweden in March 2025, described as the country's largest insolvency in decades, with roughly $5.8 billion in debt and only about $30 million of cash at the US filing (Northvolt; CNBC; Sifted; Euronews, 2026). Dissect why, and you find Part A's list in one company:
- Scaling failure — Skellefteå reportedly reached only ~1 GWh against a 16 GWh target. The hard, slow work of building manufacturing capability could not be rushed, even with billions.
- Single-customer over-reliance — when BMW cancelled an order worth ~€2bn in June 2024, the loss was devastating.
- External shock — European EV demand softened, and forecasts for the EV market share were cut, just as Northvolt needed demand to ramp.
- Capability outrun by urgency — the plant ended up running on imported machinery, workers, and cathode material because the promised domestic capability could not be built to quality and quantity in time (Sandström, 2026; SvD analysis, 2026).
And the recycling angle is not incidental
Northvolt's recycling ambitions were cut as it shrank: it sold its stake in the Hydrovolt recycling venture to Norsk Hydro in early 2025, and its remaining assets were bought by Lyten in August 2025. Nor was Northvolt alone — a wave of Western battery and battery-recycling ventures has failed or filed for protection even as demand kept rising, including the recycler Ascend Elements, which filed Chapter 11 in April 2026 after a government grant was cut (Resource Recycling; trade press, 2026).
The lesson for a recycling engineer
The ambition was sound and much of the technology worked. The failure was in scaling, financing, single-customer risk, and timing. "It works" and "it works at scale, profitably, on schedule" are different claims, and employers and investors badly need people who can tell them apart. (Volatile aftermath — re-verify current ownership and status before teaching.)
Part C — Do the work
Task 1 — Diagnose and fix
Diagnose this scenario: A mid-sized city expanded its recycling collection to accept more plastic types and went single-stream for convenience. Participation rose. Eighteen months later, the processor is charging the city to take the material, contamination is around 30%, and a local newspaper reports that much of the "recycling" is being incinerated. Name the failure modes at work (there is more than one), and propose three specific fixes in priority order.
Task 2 — Run a pre-mortem
Pick any new recycling project (a chemical-recycling plant, a new organics scheme, a deposit system, or a battery-recycling venture like the ones above). Imagine it is two years later and the project has failed. Write the three most likely reasons it failed, and one safeguard you would build in now against each. (The video below explains the pre-mortem technique.)
Task 3 — Read the Northvolt obituary
In a short paragraph, name which of Part A's failure modes you think were most responsible for Northvolt's collapse, and the single safeguard that might have changed the outcome. There is no perfect answer; you are graded on the quality of the reasoning.
Deliverable. Your diagnosis of the city scenario with three prioritised fixes, your three-point pre-mortem with safeguards, and your Northvolt analysis. Upload as text and/or a file.
Watch & read
One video on purpose: there is no well-fitting openly-licensed video on recycling failure modes, so I point you to the open primary source instead of padding.
Levitin explains the pre-mortem: deciding in advance what could make a project fail, so you can prevent it. This is the exact technique for Task 2.
Open on TED ↗Read (open, official): Northvolt's own statement, "Northvolt files for bankruptcy in Sweden" (northvolt.com, 12 March 2025). A company's own words about its failure are more instructive than any summary.
From the field
Sources
- EU-27 municipal recycling ~48.6% in 2022 vs 55% target for 2025; many states off-track. Eurostat (via Statista); European Environment Agency. https://www.eea.europa.eu/
- Northvolt — founded 2016 by Peter Carlsson and Paolo Cerruti; raised >$13–15bn; VW and Goldman Sachs backers; Chapter 11 (US) 21 Nov 2024; Swedish bankruptcy 12 March 2025 (~$5.8bn debt, ~$30m cash); Skellefteå ~1 GWh vs 16 GWh target; BMW ~€2bn contract cancelled June 2024; EV demand softened; Hydrovolt stake sold to Norsk Hydro (Jan 2025); assets acquired by Lyten (Aug 2025); wider wave of Western battery/recycling failures incl. Ascend Elements Chapter 11 (April 2026). Northvolt company statement (northvolt.com); CNBC; Sifted; Euronews (Mar 2026); Reuters/AOL; Sandström (Springer, 2026). The US (Nov 2024) and Swedish (Mar 2025) filings are distinct; aftermath is volatile.
- China 2018 import shock (end-market failure) — see Module 2 sources.
- Daniel Levitin, TED talk introducing the pre-mortem technique. https://www.ted.com/ (Creative Commons).
All URLs accessed June 2026.
Submit your work for feedback
Each task is graded immediately by an AI tutor using the rubric below. An instructor can override the AI score and leave a final comment.
Diagnose and fix the city scenario
A mid-sized city went single-stream and added more plastic types. 18 months later: processor now charges, ~30% contamination, much of it incinerated. Diagnose the failure modes and prescribe three fixes in priority order.
Grading rubric
Credit for: (1) at least three failure modes named accurately from Part A (no end market for added plastics, over-contamination from single-stream, infrastructure mismatch, possible scope-creep without buyer); (2) three concrete fixes (e.g. narrow the acceptance list, move dual-stream / add front-end pre-sort, lock in offtake contracts) ranked in priority; (3) justification of priority order. Score out of 10.
| Item | Concrete fix | Why this priority |
|---|---|---|
| Fix 1 (highest priority) | ||
| Fix 2 | ||
| Fix 3 |
Run a pre-mortem
Pick a new recycling project. Imagine it failed two years from now — name the three most likely failure modes and the safeguard you'd build in today against each.
Grading rubric
Credit for: (1) a specific, plausible project (not generic); (2) three distinct failure modes drawn from Part A's list (no end market, scaling failure, single-customer risk, external shock, contamination, underfunding); (3) one concrete, pre-emptive safeguard per failure mode (not "more communication"). Score out of 10.
| Item | Failure mode (from Part A list) | Pre-emptive safeguard you'd build in today |
|---|---|---|
| Failure mode 1 | ||
| Failure mode 2 | ||
| Failure mode 3 |
Northvolt obituary
Name the failure modes most responsible for Northvolt's collapse (cite at least one specific fact) and the single safeguard that might have changed the outcome.
Grading rubric
Credit for: (1) identification of at least two relevant failure modes (scaling failure, single-customer over-reliance, external shock, capability outrun by urgency); (2) reference to a specific Northvolt fact (1 vs 16 GWh, BMW €2bn cancellation, Mar 2025 Swedish bankruptcy); (3) one concrete, plausible safeguard (multiple offtake customers, slower phased scaling, more cash buffer, build supplier capability first). Score out of 10.
Check your reading
- 1.
Which of these is the single most important rule before adding a new material to a collection programme?
- 2.
Northvolt's Skellefteå gigafactory was reported to have reached roughly what fraction of its target capacity at the time of collapse?
- 3.
Which single commercial event in June 2024 most accelerated Northvolt's collapse?
- 4.
On the EU-27 recycling target gap, the 2022 actual rate vs the 2025 target is roughly:
- 5.
What is a pre-mortem?
- 6.
Which pair of claims should an engineer never treat as the same thing?